From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life*

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abstract

The most important element for anyone who looks at my objects is my fundamental thesis: each human being is an artist. It is even my fundamental contribution to the history of art (...). Within each human being lies a virtual creative ability. This is not to say that everyone is a painter or a sculptor, but that there is some latent creativity within each domain of human work... each type of work has a connection to art; and art is no longer a type of activity or an isolated group, with people able to do art whilst the others have to do another type of work. ... Therefore culture and economy are one and the same thing and, within our society, the most important means of production, the most important factories that create capital are schools and universities. This is why they are in the hands of the state, and this why we have to free them. (Joseph Beuys)

How to understand concepts of labour, production, cooperation and communication when capitalism is not only a mode of production but a production of worlds? To speak in these conditions about ‘production’, it is necessary to construct a radically different method than we find in political economy, economics and sociology. The question is not of the ‘end of work’ nor of ‘everything turning into work’. It is rather that we have to change the principles of valuation, the ways in which we understand the value of value. We need a new concept of ‘wealth’, a new concept of ‘production’. To create these new concepts, it is necessary to forget the philosophy of subject and that of labour, which restrain us from understanding cooperation between minds. Spirit, like intellectual or immaterial labour, has a tendency to cross the borders; it is without spatial existence and does not reduce to its manifestations. In the era of immaterial labour and cooperation between minds it is not possible to think social conflicts in terms of the friend/enemy dichotomy or in terms of the conflict between two classes, nor in terms of liberal (private/public) or socialist (individual/collective) traditions. Creation acts in another way than exclusion, competition or contradiction, the evolutionary principles of the above. How should we then translate the concept of the multitude into politics? A fertile starting point might be Gabriel Tarde’s sociology of ‘difference and repetition’, which allows us to understand that some of the key concepts of Tarde, like those of invention, imitation, memory and sympathy, might be very appropriate for explaining the mode of the cooperation of the multitude.

Let’s follow a neo-Leibnizian or neo-monadological thread to understand contemporary capitalism. We first have to put aside everything we know about Adam Smith and Karl Marx’s theories of value, wealth and work, developed in The Wealth of Nations and Capital; or in short, we have to put aside all the beliefs underlying political economy in

general. We should neither start from the institution (the business firm, the State or Empire), because, as we know, institutions are not the source of power relations but rather derive from them (and thus it is not them from which we should start our description of contemporary economy). Yet these habits and set ways of thinking are so deeply embedded in us that if we don’t start from these we are likely to give an impression of being and thinking like ‘beautiful souls’. Let us nevertheless apply a neomondadology to the contemporary business organization and revise some of the fundamental statements about it: first of all, the enterprise does not create its object (goods) but the world within which the object exists. And secondly, the enterprise does not create its subjects (workers and consumers) but the world within which the subject exists.

Within contemporary capitalism, we need to distinguish between the enterprise and the factory. Three years ago, Alcatel, a large French multi-national announced that it would let go of its eleven production factories. This separation between the enterprise and the factory is an extreme case, but one that is becoming more and more common within contemporary capitalism. In the great majority of cases, these two functions are integrated, but I would argue that their separation is emblematic of a deep transformation within capitalist mode of production. How does such a multi-national, a ‘company without factories’, define its boundaries? What will it keep within its concept of the company? In short, all the functions, all the services and all the employees that enable it to create a world: marketing, research and development, design, strategy, communications, that is, the ensemble of all the forces and arrangements (or machines) of expression.

The company producing a product or service produces a world. In its logic, the service or the product, just as the consumer or the worker, must correspond to this world; and the world in its turn has to be inscribed in the souls and bodies of consumers and workers. This inscription takes place through techniques that are no longer exclusively disciplinary. Within contemporary capitalism the company does not exist outside the producers or consumers who express it. Its world, its objectivity, its reality merges with the relationships enterprises, workers and consumers have with each other. Thus, the company, like God in the philosophy of Leibniz, seeks to construct a correspondence, an interlacing, a chiasm between the monad (consumer and worker) and the world (the company). The expression and effectuation of the world and the subjectivities included in there, that is, the creation and realization of the sensible (desires, beliefs, intelligence), precedes economic production. The economic war currently played out on a planetary scale is indeed an ‘aesthetic’ war for many reasons.

**Communication / Consumption**

Let’s start with consumption because the relationship between supply and demand has turned upside down: clients are at the centre of an enterprise’s strategy. In reality this statement stemming from political economy does not even touch our actual problem: the rise in the power of, and the strategic role played by, the machine of expression within
contemporary capitalism (through opinion building, marketing, communication according to a more sociological definition etc).

Consumption cannot simply be reduced to buying or consuming (‘destroying’) a service or product, as political economy and its critique would have it, but above everything it involves belonging to a world, adhering to a certain universe. And what kind of a world is it? We only have to switch on the television or radio, walk in a city or buy a weekly magazine or daily newspaper to know that this world is constituted by the arrangements of statements, by regimes of signs where the expression is called advertisement/publicity and the expressed constitutes a solicitation, an order which are in themselves valuations, judgements and beliefs about the world, of oneself and others. The expressed is not an ideological valuation but an incitement (it forms a sign), an invitation to espouse a way of life: a way of dressing, of having a body, of eating, communicating and travelling, a way of having a style, a way of speaking etc.

Television is a flow of advertisements interspersed by films, variety shows and news programmes. The radio is an uninterrupted flow of broadcasts and advertisements: it becomes increasingly difficult to know when one begins and the other ends. And, as Jean-Luc Godard has said, once we have removed all the pages containing advertising, a magazine is reduced to an editorial by the editor-in-chief. Unfortunately we have to admit that Deleuze was right in arguing that the company has a soul, that marketing has become its strategic centre, and that advertisers are ‘creative’.\(^1\) The business firm exploits and neutralizes the dynamics of the event and the process of the constitution of difference and repetition by making them depend on the logic of valorization. The ‘event’ for the company is called publicity (or communication, or marketing). Even a traditional industry like the automobile industry produces only cars which have already been sold. And to sell them means to construct a consumer, a clientele. Business companies invest up to forty percent of their turnover in marketing, advertising, styling, design etc. (in the American audio-visual industry fifty percent of a budget of a film is invested in its promotion and launching). Indeed the investments in the expression machine can well exceed the investments in ‘labour’.

Publicity, in a manner of ‘event’, organizes first the ways to feel so that it can solicit a way of living; it actualizes and organizes the way to feel and to be felt in the souls to be able to realize them in bodies. The company without factories thus performs incorporeal transformations (the order words of ads) that say themselves and say themselves only of the bodies.\(^2\) Incorporeal transformations produce (or would like to produce) first and foremost a change in sensibility, a change in our way to value and perceive. Incorporeal transformations have no referent, they are self-referential. There are no preliminary needs, no natural necessities that their production would satisfy. Incorporeal transformations pose valuations and their object at the same time as they create them.

\(^1\) “We are told businesses have souls, which is surely the most terrifying news in the world”; Deleuze, G. (1995) *Negotiations* 1972-1990, trans. M. Joughin. NY: Columbia UP (p.181).

Publicity constitutes the spiritual dimension of the simulacrum ‘event’ which the companies and advertising agencies invent, and which has to be realised in the body. The material dimension of this pseudo-event, its realisation, takes place when the ways of living, eating, having a body, dressing, inhabiting a place, etc. get incarnated in the body: materially, we live among goods and services that we buy, in houses, among furniture, with objects and services that we have grabbed as ‘possible’ in the flows of information and communication within which we are immersed. We go to bed, we get busy, we do this or that whilst these codes continue to circulate (they ‘insist’) in Hertzian flows, telematic networks and newspapers etc. They double up our world and our existence as a ‘possible’ which is already, in reality, an order, a command, authoritarian word even if expressed as seduction.

We could push even further the use of Gabriel Tarde’s toolbox to explain this process. In what way does marketing produce the actualisation in the soul? What type of subjectification is mobilised by publicity? The conception of an advertisement the sequence and rhythm of images, the sound track, are constructed like a *ritornello* or ‘whirl’. Some adverts resonate with us like motifs or chorus. To your surprise you may have found yourself whistling the tune of an ad (at least it has happened to me). The Leibnizian distinction between an actualisation in the soul and a realisation in the body is very important since these two processes do not coincide and can produce absolutely unpredictable effects on the subjectivity of monads.

Television networks do not know boundaries between nations, classes, status, income etc. Their images are received in non-Western countries and by the poorest in the West all of whom have little or no purchasing power at all. Incorporeal transformations act on the souls of television viewers (in poor countries, just as on those of the poor in rich countries) by creating a new sensibility, for a new ‘possible’ does exist, even if it does not exist outside of its representation in television images. For this to possibly have a certain reality it only needs to be expressed by a sign, as Deleuze has demonstrated.

But its realisation in the bodies, the ability to buy, to live with one’s body among the goods and services that signs express as constituting possible worlds, does not always follow (not at all for most of the world’s population), leading to expectations, frustrations, refusals. Suely Rolnik, an observer of these phenomena in Brazil, speaks of the two subjective figures that constitute the extremes between which the variations of the soul and body produced by the logic described above are articulated: the glamour of the ‘luxurious subjectivity’ and the misery of ‘rubbish subjectivity’. The West is terrified by new Islamic subjectivities. But it itself created this ‘monster’ through the most pacifist and seductive techniques. Here we are not faced with the remains of traditional societies to be modernised, but with the real cyborgs that combine the most ancient with the most modern. Incorporeal transformations come before and faster than corporeal transformations. Three quarters of humanity are excluded from the latter but they have easier access to the former (first and foremost through television). Contemporary capitalism does not first arrive with factories, these follow, if they follow at all. It arrives with words, signs, and images. Today, these technologies do not only precede factories, but also the machine of war.

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The advertisement event is an encounter, even a double encounter: an encounter with the soul and another one with the body. This double encounter can lead to double discrepancy since it is only an opening onto the possible in a modality of a problematic. Publicity is only a possible world, a fold that envelops virtualities. The explanation of what is enveloped, the development of the fold, can produce heterogeneous effects since the monads are all autonomous, independent, virtual singularities. Another possible world is always virtually there. The bifurcation between divergent series haunts contemporary capitalism. Incompatible worlds unfold in the same world. For this reason the process of the capitalistic appropriation is never closed onto itself, but is always uncertain, unpredictable, and open. ‘Exist is to be different’ and each time this differentiation is uncertain, unpredictable and containing risks.

Capitalism tries to control this bifurcation – the worlds are always virtually there – through continuous variation and modulation. It does not produce the subject nor the object but subjects and objects in continuous variation managed by technologies of modulation that are themselves in continuous variation – we are here far beyond the various theories of domination (e.g. Frankfurt School, Situationism, Bourdieu’s sociology). In Western countries control is not performed only through the modulation of brains but also through the moulding of bodies (prisons, schools, hospitals) and the management of life (Welfare State). It would be too generous towards our capitalist societies to think that everything happens through continuous variation of subjects and objects, the modulation of brains, and the capture of memory and attention. The control society also integrates ‘old’ disciplinary dispositifs. In non-Western societies, where disciplinary institutions and the welfare state are weaker and less developed, control means more directly the logic of war – even in times of ‘peace’ (as in Brazil).

The paradigmatic body of Western control societies is no longer the confined body of the factory worker, the mad, the sick, but the obese body (full of the worlds of business firms) or the anorexic body (refusal of these same worlds) who watch on television the bodies wounded by hunger, violence, thirst, of the majority of the world population. The paradigmatic body of our societies is no longer a mute body shaped by disciplines, but the body and soul are marked by signs, words, images (companies’ logos) registered in us in the same way that Kafka’s machine of ‘prison colony’ grafts its commands on the skin of the condemned.

In the 1970s Pasolini described very precisely how television has changed the soul and bodies of Italians, how it became the main instrument of an anthropological transformation that affected first and foremost the young. He used almost the same concept as Tarde to explain the ways in which television acts at a distance: it operates through example rather than through discipline, imitation or constraint. It is a conduct of conduct, action on possible action (of which also Foucault talks about). These incorporeal transformations that run in our heads like tunes – that circulate all over the planet, that enter in every home, that constitute the real weapon of conquest, of capture of brains and bodies – are simply incomprehensible for Marxist and economic theories. Here we are facing a paradigmatic change that we cannot capture if we start from the concepts of labour, of praxis. Indeed, these concepts could give us a false image of what production is today: the process we have just described precedes all organizations of work (and non-work).
Production of the ‘Possibles’

The ‘possible’ (product or service) that expresses the ‘world’ of the business company does not exist in advance but must be created. The world, workers, consumers and services do not pre-exist the event. On the contrary, they are generated by the event. It is on the basis of this neo-monadological assertion that we should reformulate the theory of labour completely. One can no longer understand production based on the pin factory of Smith or the Manchester factories of Marx because it actually is an effectuation of worlds before being a ‘production’. Contemporary capitalist economy follows literally the cycle of capital accumulation described by Tarde: invention, as the creation of the possible and its process of actualisation in the souls (of consumers as well as workers), is the real production, whilst what Marx and the economists call production is, in reality, a reproduction (or a manufacture of a product or a management of a service even if in this case the things are a bit more complicated).

To describe the characteristics of labour in contemporary enterprises I draw upon Philippe Zarifian’s research which seems to confirm our hypotheses in several respects. According to Zarifian, even in factories, one of the cradles of disciplinary techniques, the organization of labour is invested by the logic of the event. The change is radical. The disciplinary logic incarnates in a tradition of thoughts and an ensemble of practices that “consider events as negative: they should not take place, everything should unfold according to what was anticipated and planned, and serve the normalisation of labour”.4

The disciplinary vision of the organization of labour is ‘anti-event’, ‘anti-inventive’, since, as we know, it has to subordinate event and invention to reproduction. But the activity of firms that are tuned in with their customers is no longer exclusively organized by forecasting and planning. Instability, uncertainty, the necessity to face changes in real time, all deeply penetrate the organization of labour. Labour becomes, as Tarde had seen well, a set of events, “of things that happen in unpredictable ways that exceed what would be considered normal”.5 The response to the rise of the unforeseeable, the uncertain, events, involves mobilising individual and collective attention towards ‘what is happening, what has happened and what will happen’, and this means invention, the ability to organize, to combine, to make happen. Events and inventions are distributed all along the cycle of ‘production’ (from the design to the manufacturing of the product) and get organized alongside routines, habits, codified actions. Even the organization of labour is literally ‘difference and repetition’.

In one of his most visionary writings, Marx talks about labour no longer as a direct act of transformation of raw materials, but as an act of control over production. But in contemporary capitalism control means paying attention to events whether they are taking place in the ‘market’ or the workshop; it means paying attention to being able to act, to anticipate and ‘being up to it’. It demands learning from uncertainty and mutations, it means becoming active in the face of instability and collaborating in ‘communicational networks’. Summarizing Zarifian’s thoughts on the organization of

4 Zarifian, P. (2003) À Quoi Sert Le Travail?, La Dispute, p.95
5 Zarifian, p.95.
work in contemporary companies, we might say that we have passed from operation to action and from teamwork to activity in networks.

Moreover, according to Zarifian, competition between companies is aimed not at conquering a market but at ‘capturing a clientele’, at building a *customer capital* which is managed monopolistically. The market, as understood by political economy, does not exist or is identified with the constitution/capture of customers. Two elements are essential to this strategy: building customer loyalty and having the capacity to renew what is on offer through innovation. The space within which this strategy is constituted is an informational and communicational territory which transforms the co-operation between minds into a public/clientele. The capture of a clientele and the building of its loyalty means first and foremost capturing attention and memory, capturing minds, creating and capturing desires, beliefs (the sensible) and networks.

All production is production of services, that is, a transformation of “the conditions of activity and the capacity for future actions of customers, users, and the public”, which in the end always aims at the ‘mode of life’. The service does not satisfy a pre-existing demand, but it must anticipate it, it must ‘make it happen’. This anticipation takes place entirely within the domain of the virtual by mobilising resources such as linguistic resources and language, communication, rhetoric, images etc. The anticipation of services by the virtual and signs has the advantage, on the one hand, to be able to use all properties of language, thus opening up the exploration of several possibles, and, on the other hand, to enable work on sense through communication.

**Autonomy and Responsibility of the Worker-Monad**

If this conceptualisation of activity as event mobilises some of the terms of Deleuze and Spinoza’s philosophies, Zarifian, inspired by Tarde, draws upon Leibniz’ monadology to think about the subjectivity of workers and their cooperation within contemporary capitalism. Even in the firm without factories the modulation of spirit (spiritual memory) is organized with the moulding of body (forming of corporeal memory – which is the essence of Taylorism). Monadology allows Zarifian to articulate his paradoxical thesis: activity becomes jointly more deeply individual and more deeply collective. As Tarde rightly saw, Leibniz allows us to escape from the dilemmas involved in the relationships between individual and collective, and thus both from individualism and holism, since the collective and the social (the world in Leibniz’ language) are included in the individuality of the monad: “The relationship of the individual with his/her activity tends to become a monad, a totality in itself (…) This relationship is no longer seen, at first sight, as a fraction, functionally determined, of the organic division of labour. It becomes global on its own account.”

As for Tarde, the worker-monads are open, even twice: from the inside towards the outside and from the outside towards the inside. Zarifian gives the example of a

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6 Zarifian, p.47.
7 Zarifian, p.62.
financial adviser who works for the Post Office, having his/her own autonomy, responsibility, power of initiative and decision towards a client. Supiot’s work as well as our own research suggests that responsibility, autonomy, initiatives are the competencies of an increasing number of workers with no distinction whether salaried, independent or unemployed (competencies of an unspecified subjectivity).

The relationship of the monad (financial adviser) and a client is a singularity included within a universe, the universe of the commercial operations of the Post Office. The monad is an ‘opening from inside’ in the sense that it condenses within it the ‘stakes surrounding it’. The universe of the enterprise “penetrates the monad from the inside without cancelling its singularity. On the contrary, it is only within this very singularity that this global universe acquires meaning and makes its impact”.

Here we are confronted once again with what we saw earlier (monads are for the world of the enterprise, and the latter is included within the soul of each of them in a singular way), and what Zarifian calls the *interpenetration of two globalities*: a monad is a universe of the enterprise which is present in the monad’s interiority. The company not only has to create a world for the consumer, as we saw above, but also for the worker. To work within a contemporary organization means to belong, to adhere to its world, to its desires and beliefs. To be sure, this is the ideology of contemporary organizations but it represents a radical change in the ‘subjectivity’ of the organization and the subjectivity of workers. It is at this price that ‘work’ is carried out. And this is a double edged sword: on the one hand, it affirms workers’ autonomy, independence and singularity (individual substance), on the other hand, it requires workers to belong to the organizational world, since this “world is internal to the situation and conduct of the subject.”

The distinction between actualisation in the souls and realisation in the bodies is also valid here. Managerial practices are confronted with the unpredictability of this double encounter in the soul and in the body which is a pure event; and leads to discrepancies between the workers’ subjectivities and organizations’ strategies in the same way as was discussed above in relation to the consumers. These techniques of control do not replace disciplinary techniques but are combined with them. The emphasis on control or discipline depends on hierarchical levels, competencies of the workers and the type of production they are engaged in. In the new organization of labour the Tayloristic socialisation of workers based on physical proximity inside the factory workshop is lacking and gives way to individualisation which is not based on carceral solitude of the working post but on a sort of monastic solitude. According to Zarafian, this is a form of individualisation that condenses within itself an increasing number of social relationships. The dimension of the monastic solitude of work nourishes social exchanges that acquire meaning and value only through what got initiated within the

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8 Zarifian, p.64.
9 Zarifian, p.64.
10 Zarifian, p.65.
monad – what Zarifian refers to as the opening of the monad from inside towards outside. Here the activity does no longer develop in a team, as with disciplinary mechanisms, but in networks which modulate the relation between singularity and multiplicity according to the requirements of valorization. The neo-monadological paradigm of the event, of the invention of the possible (subject and object) shows its effectiveness precisely in the domain of work.

Finance and the Machines of Expression

The machines of expression and constitution of the sensible (desires and beliefs) do not only act within the organization of production but also in finance. The same process that we saw at play in advertising applies in the fixation of rates on the stock exchange. Money is a force of choice, valuation and direction of investments. As shown by the latest work of the Regulation School, financial valuation is a product of the logic of opinion and not of simple objective and impersonal market mechanisms. Financial valuation and choices depend on the ability to ‘give birth to shared beliefs’ where there only exist different and heterogeneous ways of envisaging the future. Yet to explain the functioning of public opinion we shall not refer to the theories of the Regulation School, but to Gabriel Tarde who, drawing upon his neo-monadology, had already a century ago defined stock exchanges as laboratories in social psychology. A quotation on the stock exchange presupposes the transformation of individual judgements into collective judgements. According to Tarde, the determination of value takes place through public opinion whose development is in turn affected by two factors: the press and conversation.  

As all social quantities, opinion has to be understood as a form of interaction and appropriation of the brains (of the monads) which relate to each other according to relations of leaders and the led. Opinion is never a simple procedure, an impersonal mechanism, a play of systematic mirrors as the Regulation School would have us believe. We talk about ‘opinion’ but in reality there are always ‘two opinions’, that is, there are always plays of forces, monads that agree or disagree according to one-sided or reciprocal relations.

But how did common opinion become such? Not spontaneously, given the diversity among people and the complexity of the questions. There have been suggestions from instigators who, throughout history, have been making opinion by expressing it; and there have been imposition from military or civilian despots who, by violating opinion, lead it. So let’s get it right: the real

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11 “What Saint-Beuve says of genius, that ‘genius is like a king that creates its people’, is essentially true of the great journalist. How many advertising agents create their own public? To be true, for Edouard Drumont to incite anti-Semitism, his agitation attempts had to coincide with a certain frame of mind disseminated within the population; however, for as long as there wasn’t a voice to express this state of mind, it remained at an individual level, weak, not contagious, unaware of itself. Who voiced it created it as a collective force, maybe artificial, but real nevertheless.” Tarde, G. (1998) 
government is constituted by the opinion of the group of leaders, or the group of military or civilian terrorists.12

Regulation economists, preoccupied by the justification of democracy, recognise the role of inter-cerebral relationships in the determination of stock exchange values, but they associate with opinion a soothing, regulating dimension mutilated of the passion to have. Looking at things ‘from above’, says Tarde, we could see in the prices the constraint of an exterior and impersonal authority or spontaneous authority (the market) that imposes itself on individuals.

But, in reality, when we enter into the precise and explanatory details, we see that there are no prices that have not been fixed by some dominating wills that have seized the market (...) the stock exchange only needs a bullish or bearish elite to decide the fate of value. The price of wheat, quoted on the London and New York stock exchanges, is the result of the conflict between two armies that speculate up or down, commanded by well known leaders of various influences, who legislate for the whole world.13

Even in stock exchanges the market does not exist but is rather identified as the capture or constitution of the public, the clientele. The one-sided power relationships that the ‘terrorists’ or ‘despots’ impose on the management of intersubjective connections that produce opinion are based upon the forms of knowledge that give them a differential advantage, and that allow them to conduct temporarily the conducts of others. The power to act increases as society acquires new relational technologies as the machines of expression develop. “It seems (...) that it increases with the means of action, the press, the telegraph, telephone that the progress of the civilization lends to influential individuals”.14 But why has finance acquired today such a power of choice, valuation, and decision on the economy that it reverses the relationship between industry and finance characterising disciplinary societies? Because money is, in the same way as language, the existence of the possible ‘as such’. It is for this reason that money, rather than the ‘real economy’, is able to control and capture the organization of difference and repetition and its motor: the virtual.

In societies of control money represents the colonisation of the power of virtuality by capitalists. Tarde is useful here again. He asserts that money is above all a force of mind, that it is a “possibility, an infinite virtuality” that tends towards its actualisation. If political economy looks like social physics, it is not only because of the possibility to quantify its activities and products, but mostly because of the exchange between virtual and actual which money makes possible. Just as physical phenomena are a continuous conversion of potential energy into actual energy, so are economic phenomena, for Tarde, a perpetual exchange between money and concrete wealth. When wealth expresses itself in money, its power to act becomes virtual and it multiplies. The difference between the power to act of material wealth and the power to act of money corresponds to the one that exists between “the actual and the virtual, I was going to say the finite and the infinite”.15 A guaranteed and unconditional income seems to me the

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14 Psychologie économique, I, pp.32-33.
15 Psychologie économique, I, p.311.
only way to give back to money its virtuality, appropriated by the capitalists. In the capitalist economy, the virtuality of money is subordinated to capitalist valorization. It is thus limited. Only guaranteed income could make the virtual power of money to act in an absolute immanence, that of the cooperation between minds.

The Firm Without Factories and the Cooperation Between Minds

To understand the event of the cooperation between minds, it is not enough to say that work becomes emotional, linguistic or virtuoso because even the configuration of capitalistic accumulation and exploitation changes radically. The capitalist economy is no longer structured through the temporal sequence of production, markets and consumption, as the economists and Marxists still teach us. Let’s take as an example the first stock exchange capitalization of possible worlds: Microsoft (even if the same goes for the ‘cultural’, artistic and media production, as we saw with Zarifian, but also for the classical industrial production). Political economy and Marxism describe the process as follows: Microsoft is a company which recruits workers (data-processing and information technology engineers) who provide a product or a service (software) which, thereafter, is sold to the customers in the market. Microsoft realises surplus value exploiting its workers and then it enters into competition with other companies and this competition leads to a monopoly. Neo-mondalogy offers us a radically different account: Microsoft does not initially have a relation with a ‘market’ or with ‘workers’, but through the latter with the cooperation between minds. It is from here that we must start.

Cooperation between minds expresses a power of co-creation and co-realization which means, in this specific domain, the capacity of creating and realizing (free) software. To express itself this cooperation does not need the company or the capitalist, as claimed by Marx and Smith. On the contrary, it depends strictly on the development and diffusion of science, technological devices and communication networks, the systems of education, health, and any other service which concerns the ‘population’. The cooperation’s power of creation and realization depends thus on the availability and accessibility of ‘public goods’ or ‘collectives’ and ‘commons’ (science, knowledge, Internet, health etc.).

It expresses itself according to modalities which are quite specific to the cooperation between minds: an invention of software is always an arrangement and organization of a multiplicity of intelligences, know-hows and affects that circulate in networks (network of networks), which is not a homogeneous fabric but a heterogeneous arrangement of singularities, flows and patchworks (community of free and singular developers). The creation and realization of software are a power of disjunction and coordination both in creation and in realization (diffusion) because it arranges a multiplicity (of developers) to create software but also a multiplicity (of users) to effectuate it. And the two processes tend to merge.
Capture, both in creation and realization, is always a reciprocal seizure open to the unpredictable and infinite, because the ‘creator’ and the ‘user’ tend to merge. The two functions, radically separated by political economy, are thus reversible. Capture, the reciprocal seizure, makes the other monads ‘collaborators’ even if not all express the same power of creation and organization. The form of creation and realization is public because it is done under the eyes, desires and beliefs of all (under the eyes, desires and beliefs of ‘unspecified subjectivity’ and not as recognition but as a meeting of possible worlds). The public dimension of cooperation is guaranteed and defended by a licence (Copy-left, the protector of the right to copy, modify and diffuse), which recognizes at the same time the individual initiative, the singular (the moral right of each inventor) and the public nature of activities and their products (all the inventions constitute a ‘common pot’ available and ‘free’ for all).

Microsoft acts differently. Its amazing profits are not based on the exploitation of employees, as political economy and Marx teach us, but on the constitution of a clientele and a monopoly exerted upon it. The ‘work’ of the company and its employees consists in a one-sided capture which aims at transforming the multiplicity of ‘collaborators’ (monads) into a multiplicity of ‘customers’. Its employees (not only engineers but also marketing people, lobbyists etc. trying to guarantee its monopoly) constitute an interface with the cooperation between minds, and their work activity consists of the neutralization and deactivation of the co-creation and co-realization of multiplicity. The power of arrangement, instead of being distributed in a heterogeneous way in the cooperation between minds, is concentrated in the cooperation of the company.

The immediately public form of cooperation is denied by the secrecy which governs the activities in the company (patent) and the secrecy which governs the diffusion of the software (copy-right, impossibility to access the source code) in the cooperation between minds. The neutralization and the capture of the power of co-creation and co-realization are now founded on intellectual property and not on property as the means of production as in the ‘productive’ cooperation of the factory.

Under the conditions of contemporary capitalism, the constitution of the company (and the capital-labour relationship) is a political operation because it divides the cooperation between minds into ‘workers employed’, on the one hand, and into public/customers on the other. In this way the power of co-creation and co-realization, instead of being divided in a heterogeneous way in the multiplicity, is divided between the invention which is assigned to the company (and to the ‘workers employed’) and the reproduction which is assigned to the public/customers. The categories of political economy impose a division between ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ which does not hold any more in the cooperation between minds.

The enterprise and the capital-labour relation determine a rigid and non-reversible distribution of the forces of invention and repetition by assigning them onto different subjects in a normative way. Intellectual property has thus a political function: it determines who has the right to create and who has the duty to reproduce. The enterprise and the capital-labour relation not only prevent us from seeing the social dimension of the production of wealth, but they determine the new forms of exploitation.
and subjugation. Unemployment, poverty and precariousness are the direct result of the action of companies (and the politics of employment): the capture of social productivity imposes a social hierarchisation, a division between what is ‘productive’ and what is not. The company exploits society above all by exploiting workers.

**Products of the Cooperation Between Minds: Common Goods**

Cooperation between minds, unlike cooperation in the Smithian and Marxian factory, produces public, collective or common goods: knowledge, language, science, culture, art, information, forms of life, relations with oneself, others and the world etc. We distinguish common goods and public or collective goods as understood in political economy. Indeed, the former are not only like water, air and nature etc. – ‘goods’ of all – but rather created and realized like the modalities that Marcel Duchamp uses to speak about artistic creation. A work of art is indeed for one half the result of the activity of the artist and for the other half the result of the activity of the public (which looks at it, reads it, or listens to it).

It is this ‘artistic’ dynamic, and not the one of producer/consumer, which is at work in the creation and realization of common goods. These goods, unlike the tangible, appropriable, exchangeable, consumable products of the capital-labour relationship, are intelligible, inappropriable, inexchangeable, inconsumable, as Gabriel Tarde puts it. Common goods, the results of unspecified subjectivities’ co-creation and co-realization, are free, as well as undivided and infinite. The inappropriable nature of the common good means that the common good (knowledge, language, work of art, science, etc.), assimilated by the one who acquires it, does not become anyone’s ‘exclusive property’, and that it finds its legitimacy by being shared. Only the goods produced within the capital-labour relationship imply necessarily an individual appropriation because their consumption expends and ‘destroys’, that is, renders them intransmissible for anyone else. They can only be ‘for me or for you’ and the attempt to share them fails systematically because of the nature of the object.

A common good is inexchangeable because of its indivisible and inappropriable nature. In economic exchange everyone, as political economy teaches us, finds his/her own account, but only by alienating herself from that she has in her possession. In the ‘exchange’ of common goods (of knowledge, for example), the one who transmits them does not lose them, does not suffer by socializing them, but, on the contrary, their value increases in the organization of their diffusion and sharing. Common goods are neither consumable in terms of the criteria of political economy. Only the exchange of goods produced in the factory of Smith and Marx satisfy a desire through ‘destructive consumption’ of the exchanged product. But “does one consume his beliefs in thinking about them or the masterpieces that one admires by looking at them”?

Any consumption of a common good can lead immediately into the creation of new knowledge or new masterpieces. Circulation becomes the fundamental moment of the process of production and consumption.

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16 *Psychologie économique*, I, p.88.
The rules of the production, circulation and consumption of common goods are not the same as those of the ‘productive cooperation’ of the factory and its economy. Marxism and political economy enter into a crisis because the creation and realization of common goods – which takes the same place in contemporary capitalism as material production had in industrial capitalism – are no longer explicable by their conception of the productive cooperation (organized and commanded by the capitalist). The sharing of wealth thus created can no longer be measured nor legitimated by the ideas of ‘productive labour’ or ‘utility’. The capital-labour relationship is, as we saw in the case of Microsoft, the fundamental instrument of reducing common goods into private goods, of ignoring the social nature of ‘production’, of transforming collaborators into customers. This means imposing a logic suitable for political economy onto the cooperation between minds (whose action is ‘indivisible and infinite’): a logic of scarcity onto an economy that has overcome it.

The theoretical option contained in Marxism and political economy is conservative and reactionary: it legitimates the expropriation of common wealth by the enterprise. The apprehension and measurement of the production and distribution of wealth on the basis of the capital-labour relationship constitutes one of the major obstacles that social and political struggles confront today (cf. the impotence of the trade unions and institutional left who have no answers to the blackmail operated by the ‘financial holes’ of the social budgets – the deficit in the pension regime, the deficit in the health insurance system etc. – and who defend the ‘social rights’ of Fordism because they do not understand, nor do they want to, that the production of wealth exceeds the capital-labour relationship).

The resistance to the capitalist appropriation of common goods (an appropriation which today constitutes the essence of the neo-liberal strategy) will have effectiveness only if it assumes the primacy of the cooperation between minds over the capital-labour relationship. The firm without factories must integrate in its organization of labour the modalities of creation and realization of the neo-mondalologic cooperation and the dynamics of unspecified subjectivities to be able to capture this social ‘productivity’. Even for the company, it is an imperative to assume the cooperation between minds as a political stake. It is only in this way that it is possible to define the new objectives and terrains of struggle which concern precisely the multiplicity of which also workers are part of. It is only in this way that the public/clientele relation may be reversed into the political process of the constitution of the multitude.

**Capitalism and the Ignoble Ways of Life**

We can now draw a few general conclusions. The differences to theories that adopt the ‘paradigm of subject/labour’, which I have tried to highlight, are remarkable. It is not ‘productive’ labour (commanded, subordinated) that is exploited, but the arrangement of difference and repetition. It is the arrangement of the creation of possible worlds and their realisation (of which manufacturing and its factories is only one mode) that is the object of capitalist appropriation. ‘Productive’ labour, as understood by Marxists or more generally by economists, is integrated within this arrangement but forms only one of its constituent parts. ‘Production’ is a heterogeneous arrangement which entails a
multiplicity of subjects who are involved in multiple activities both inside and outside the firm (workers, consumers, public). Among these activities we should include watching television, as Godard and Guattari suggested.

More deeply, we should rethink the category of labour. It is strangely reduced and mutilated by economists and socialists who always regard it as an activity subordinated and mobilized by the firm and distinguish between the activity of invention and activity reproduction, between difference and repetition. We should rethink it on the basis of ‘free’ activity independent of, and as a precondition to, the mobilization by the firm, that is, on the basis of whatever subjectivity.

Gabriel Tarde gives us the categories to define this ‘free’ activity independent of, and as a precondition to, the mobilization by the firm. It can be located in a spectrum that ranges from the activity of an automaton to that of a genius. One can pass from the one to the other by infinite and infinitesimal variations. What is involved in the one as in the other is memory and its conatus: attention. In the activity of automaton, attention is completely absorbed in the realization of the completed action and memory is more a ‘habit’ inscribed in the body. Subjectivity is an automatism; a centre of action that receives and transmits movements and it corresponds to the senso-motorial memory.

In the activity of genius, on the contrary, activity is not captured by completed action and memory inserts itself in between action and reaction as indetermination and choice, surrounded by a ‘peaceful cloud’ of possibles. Subjectivity is always a centre of action, but it now has the capacity to insert a delay, duration between action and reaction, in order to develop something new. Memory no longer coincides with sensori-motor memory. It is no longer a habit, an automatism, but intellectual memory able to embrace heterogeneity and invent. According to Tarde, we should therefore first “separate as clearly as possible work from invention”.17

Labour, as the Marxists and economists understand it, is the capture of this ‘free’ action, and has to be included within this new framework, within this new way of evaluating activities. Only once we have established this distinction will we be able to see, in the interior of economic labour, like intellectual labour or artistic labour, in what proportions invention (production) and labour (reproduction), creation and imitation, contribute in defining the different activities.

In the Marxian formula of ‘living labour’ it is not only the concept of ‘labour’ but also that of ‘living’ that we must criticize. For indeed the latter does not refer to the concept of living we borrowed from biologists – memory that preserves and creates the sensible – but to the faculties of the subject of the classical German philosophy. The difference to industrial work, which acts principally on physical (or chemical) forces, is that the action of memory acts principally on ‘psychological forces’ (the sensible) because of its capacity to imprint and receive the print of the desires and beliefs of other minds. Yet in the paradigm of difference, the activity of memory is distinguished from ‘labour’ not only because it relates to the sensible but also because it arranges in inseparable ways the differential activity (invention) and the repetitive, reproductive activity (imitation).

as powers of time. It possesses both the faculty to create something new (an image, a sensation, an idea) and the faculty to reproduce it infinitely (it is the ‘perpetual printing of images, sensations, ideas’).

Memory does not evolve nor is it socialized according to the methods of the objectification of subjective activity described by the various theories of labour. Memory has the particularity of being able to externalise without alienating itself. A discovery or an invention incarnates, at the same time, inside ourselves in our nerve or muscular memory “under a form of a mental cliché or acquired habit, a notion, or a talent – or outside ourselves, in a book or a machine. We could equally say that a book is an external memory, or that a memory is an internal book that an invisible librarian, hidden in our under-ego, puts under our eyes when the time comes.” Memory can operate a kind of double incorporation, internal and external. The possibility of being able to socialize without alienating itself is founded on the specificity of common goods and their economy – the inappropriable, inexchangeable, and inconsumable.

Even if, as Marx would have it, we start from the objective element, from the goods, we still come to the exhaustion of the paradigm of thinking based upon ‘subject’ and ‘work’: goods are not the crystallisation of the working time of the workers, but the crystallisation of events, inventions, knowledge on the one hand, and the crystallisation of the activity that reproduces multiplicities of subjectivities (which in turn can to different degrees be considered as a series of inventions, events, knowledge).

In the societies of control, the aim is no longer to appropriate as in societies of sovereignty, nor to combine and increase the power of the forces as in disciplinary societies, but to create worlds. This is the condition for capitalist valorisation today. By reversing the Marxian definition we could say that capitalism is not a mode of production, but a production of modes. Capitalism is a mannerism. In societies of control, the alternatives that are open are even more radical and dramatic than those afforded by disciplinary societies.

On the one hand, capitalist modes open possibilities for ignoble life. The ‘different’ styles of life are in reality a variation of the same; the capitalist ways of life produce a homogenisation and not a singularisation of individualities. The creation of possibles is not open to the unpredictability of events, but it is codified according to the laws of the valorization of capital; the modes of subjectification do not draw upon the infinity of monstrosities concealed within the human soul but they take for their reference the white middle-class man, expressed and caricatured in an almost criminal way by the neo-conservatives within the current American administration.

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18 *Psychologie économique*, I, p. 353. Soviet psychology, whilst considering the French tradition idealist (through the work of Bergson), also discovered through its own means the double incorporation of memory described by Tarde. According to Vygotsky and Lurja, human beings differ from other animals through the use of both external instruments and internal instruments. Signs, symbols and language are not only external instruments to cooperate with others, but also internal instruments to plan and organize conduct. Vygotskij, L.S. and R.L. Aleksandr (1997) *Strumento e segno nello sviluppo del bambino*. Laterza.
Equally, the Western ways of life (the American way of life) cannot be extended to other world populations without risking, for example, the ecological destruction of the planet. Capitalism can no longer present itself as ‘universal’ – its expansionary power finds its limit precisely in relation to its modes of life: Westerners can no longer impose to the rest of the world a Marshall plan that would reproduce their ways of life. Any generalisation would presuppose a radical questioning of these modes of life. If, as the bloodthirsty American president would want, ‘one cannot touch the American way of life’, we need to prepare for and engage in a permanent war. The comparisons with the Roman Empire are often misleading because here we do not prepare war to expect peace, but to save Western ways of life at the expense of all other inhabitants of the planet.

The Anti-Productive Functions of Contemporary Capitalism

Capitalism, as a production of modes of life, as a proliferation of possible worlds, proves to be a force of anti-production and destruction of the cooperation between minds and its biological conditions of existence in several respects:

Firstly, it destroys the power of creation and reproduction of individual and collective singularities since it continues to measure the process of the constitution of difference and repetition as ‘work’. Unemployment, precariousness and poverty cannot be determined by the lack of ‘work’ (and employment). They are procedures of the destruction of the powers of invention, that is, the subjective conditions of the process that constitutes difference and repetition. What is at stake is not employment, but the virtual power of creation (Beuys) of all and each of us.

To eliminate genius is their obvious preoccupation. This should not concern us too much if only genius was at stake; but it is not only genius that is at stake, it is our individual originality, our individual creativity whose very effectiveness and existence are threatened; because all of us, in some ways from the most obscure to the most famous, do invent, improve, change, at the same time as we imitate. There is not one of us who, throughout his/her life, does not leave a profound or imperceptible mark on his/her language, religion, science, art.19

The paradigm of work-employment is actively involved in, and complicit to, this destruction since it legitimizes the organizing mechanisms of power and appropriation in societies of control. On the one hand, it legitimizes the appropriation (largely for free) of the multiple relations constituting the worlds without any distinction between work and non-work, between work and life. On the other hand, it legitimizes and organizes a distribution of income still bound to the exercise of employment, to the subordination to a private or public superior.

Today surplus is produced not in the exploitation of labour, but in this gap between the appropriation of wealth produced by the heterogeneity of subjectivities and the modes of organizing, as explained above, and its distribution organized and controlled by work-employment. The problem is not to proclaim ‘the end of work’, nor to put forward

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the opposite argument that ‘everyone works’, but to change the principles of valuation, to change the way of conceptualising ‘the value of value’, as Nietzsche suggested in *On the Genealogy of Morality* over a century ago.

Contemporary capitalism destroys cooperation between minds also in the sense that it transforms creative activities into ‘pollution’ of brains – to pick up again the proposal of Félix Guattari. The activities that actualize the public, the collective perception and intelligence, are anti-productive since by subordinating the constitution of desires and beliefs (the sensible) to the imperatives of valorization, they produce an impoverishment, a formatting of subjectivity that offers a spectre of possibilities ranging from the glamour of ‘luxury subjectivity’ to the misery of ‘subjectivity loss’. The anti-productive functions express all their power of pollution to the mind because they touch directly the sensible, sense and living (memory).

**From the Capital-Labour to the Capital-Life Relationship**

In societies of control, it is no longer the activity of the worker that epitomises ‘alienation’, but the activity of the cooperation between brains organized and controlled by the logic of the firm without factories.

By using Tarde we may identify the power and stakes of these activities in the following way. We can define ‘cerebral work’ according to the ways in which it acts on the *wills, intelligences* and *sensibilities*. What are ‘the real objects’, the products of inter-cerebral action? The rigidity of conviction (beliefs) and the solidity of passions (desires) with which one wants to ‘defeat, transform, eradicate’ other convictions and passions. And what is the raw material out of which these convictions and passions are made, which contemporary workers use in the same way as industrial workers used iron, coal, etc.? This raw material is the *habit*, that is, opinions, tastes, customs and know-hows, which, born in the mind of an inventor, have become routines through imitation and repetition. Inversely, what are the tastes, opinions, behaviours, the ways of life? They are the contraction of bodily and mental habits. Habits and institutions that have to be constituted, or habits and institutions that have to be decomposed, to make place for others.

What are the forces that have to be mobilised in the inter-cerebral work? *Attention* and *memory* as the forces of creation and constitution of habits. Cerebral work does not therefore limit itself to the ‘manipulation of symbols’ or linguistic production, as it is too quickly assumed today to delineate the new conditions of this type of work. The formation of behaviours and habits, of competences and knowledge has to mobilise the intensive and pre-individual forces of memory and body to transform prejudices, opinions, tastes, passions, knowledges: “In the industry of transformation, the obstacle comes from chemical affinities, either from physical cohesions, or motor or other forces. In the work of inter-spiritual action, the obstacle stems first and foremost from the inattention on the part of those to whom we address ourselves and who need to be

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touched; then from the ideas or desires, the feelings to uproot in them, as if they were contrary to the aim that we pursue, namely conflicting inter-spiritual actions exercised by others in the form of ancient customs, new fashions or individual whims”.

We are, in other words, faced with a form of capitalist accumulation that is no longer only based on the exploitation of labour in the industrial sense, but also on that of knowledge, life, health, leisure, culture et c. What organizations produce and sell not only includes material or immaterial goods, but also forms of communication, standards of socialisation, perception, education, housing, transportation etc. The explosion of services is directly linked to this evolution; and this does not only involve industrial services but also the mechanisms that organize and control ways of life. The globalisation that we are currently living is not only extensive (delocalisation, global market) but also intensive: it involves cognitive, cultural, affective and communicative resources (the life of individuals) as much as territories, genetic heritage (plants, animals, and humans), the resources necessary to the survival of the species and the planet (water, air, etc). It is about putting life to work.

Foucault argues that life does not become the object of power without it also becoming at the same time the basis for new forms of resistance. On the basis of neo-monadology we can maybe make a few steps forward in the definition of the capital-life relationship. We know, and here we are moving away from Foucault, that life, its process of constitution, creation and evolution, is given by the arrangement of difference and repetition, and that the forces that are engaged in this process are those of ‘pure feeling’ and virtual bifurcations (beliefs and desires). Furthermore and more fundamentally, feeling presupposes memory (and its virtualities) and its conatus attention.

Power can only capture this dynamic by adapting to the characteristics of the action of monads and their constitutive process, since cooperation between minds precedes the division of labour. It can capture this force of actualisation and realisation, but it cannot subordinate it in the same way as it did with labour. The real subordination of activity to capitalist valorization that Marx describes cannot function with the cooperation between minds. It can only appropriate the organization of difference and repetition formally; in other words, it can make incursions in the archipelago, in the patchworks, in the networks of subjectivities and ‘communities’ – but it cannot draw the map of the archipelago or patchwork, nor create forms of life.

**The Modality of the Cooperation Between Minds**

Neither socialist nor liberal theories can organize and respect the conditions of cooperation between minds without destroying it, without producing anti-productive effects. Neither praxis and its collective wholes (such as class, value, the social) nor the liberal paradigm (and its triptych: individual freedom, market and property) can apprehend the modality of the cooperation between minds. If capitalism wants to exploit and control life it has to control the conditions of the process of constitution of

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difference and repetition. What are these conditions? We shall borrow a definition from Gabriel Tarde’s neo-monadology:

**Sympathy**

The co-production here defines the functioning of the concatenation in the constituent process of life founded on sympathy, confidence and reciprocal possession. Monads relate to one and another through two modes of action:

1. Warrior to warrior, or rival to rival;
2. Assisted to assisted, or collaborator to collaborator.  

Friendship, feeling of fraternity and pietas are the expressions of the sympathetic relation that is necessary to presuppose in order to explain the constitution and the dynamics of the whole society. Even in the ancient societies ‘the essence and content’ of social relations is the relationship between *equals*, between *peers*, and thus the exclusion of the slaves, minor sons and women; and of course the latter are in relation to the common interest of the peers an obstacle to overcome. In relation to this same interest, minor sons, women, slaves are simple means to be used. But none of them is an associate.

What is specifically modern, according to Tarde, is the ‘enormous extent’ of the group of humans within which there is assumed the reign of a ‘superior feeling’ of sympathy and confidence. The relations of rivalry and collaboration are always more or less intertwined, but it is by sympathy, mutual assistance, collaboration and confidence that creation takes place. Sympathy is the fundamental social relation that tends – in spite of, and also thanks to, conflicts – to spread. By diffusing one-sided or reciprocal relations, imitation, by multiplying contacts between men, does nothing else but reinforce and spread sympathy: “The feeling of a man’s sympathy for man is born of the contacts which put a man in a struggle with a man, and nourishes itself from all the relations of social life.”

The changes in the modes of management of contemporary enterprises, like the strategies of the construction and capture of the publics/clientele, must take account of the fact that you can’t command or order an invention, and that confidence, sympathy and love are rarely favourable to the organization of the cooperation of minds.

**Hybridization, Encounter, Interference**

Sympathy, confidence and reciprocal possession are presuppositions of the constitution of the world and the self because difference is the motor of the cooperation between minds. Difference acts in another way than competition and contradiction, the evolutionary principles of practice and liberal theories. Difference unfolds its power of creation and construction through sympathetic co-production, confidence and love but

not through acting and coordinating egoisms. Two contrary terms can pass their contradiction only by the definitive victory of one over the other, while two different terms can combine their heterogeneity by hybridization. The fertility of the logic of difference results from its capacity to make heterogeneous forces to encounter, co-produce and co-adapt the forces that do not oppose according to the logic of contraries, but to develop themselves in a logic of autonomous and independent series of possible worlds.

This conceptual difference emerges again more radically if we consider, with Tarde, co-production as a veritable process of creation, as innovative hybridization of different series. Co-production does not mean compatibility of the process of constitution with its ambient but invention. To invent means, inversely, to adapt forces and combine them with others. Tarde assigns to the invention-adaptation couple the capacity to resolve conflicts, because it succeeds in determining an agreement between forces not by the means of a mediation or convention but by establishing a new plane of immanence where the forces co-produce new ‘modulation’ of their relations and discover a ‘way not yet paved’ (‘fata viam inveniunt’) that permits them to use themselves reciprocally.

The most meaningful example of the modalities of action of the invention is the creation of living. Tarde himself established a direct relation between invention and creation in the birth of a new species.26 “There is meeting and interference of two hereditary rays, of two lines that, alternating, are striving to agree on a new specific plan. In the impregnated germ, in other words, two different series, but not at all contrary, of successive generations, opens up an ensemble and they are co-adapted in the production of a new harmony, a new modulation of the common type”.

The opposition, the struggle for existence, on the contrary, does not possess such inventive efficiency of new types; they do not draw a new specific plan, a new modulation. They limit themselves to the purification and defence of the types already created. Invention is therefore not a contract, a peace treaty or a convention. It is neither a balance, equilibrium nor a mutual neutralization, but an invention-force which at the same time as it creates something new invents new uses for forces. It is with this ontology of invention and repetition that capitalism must measure itself.

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27 L’Opposition Universelle Les Empêcheurs de Penser en Rond, p.136.
the translators  Jussi Vähämäki and Akseli Virtanen are the editors of this issue. Valerie Fournier is from Leicester University and her writing so far has been concerned with disciplinary practices, subjectivity and embodiment in organizations, and has been published in a range of sociological and organizational journals such as Body and Society, Gender, Work and Organization and The Sociological Review. Her growing commitment to exploring alternative forms of organizing has directed her interests towards anarchist theory, anti-capitalist protest movements, alternative medicine and women farmers' cooperatives.