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Microsociology and the Ritual Event

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The 'revival' of ritual activities in China after the Cultural Revolution seems to entail a paradox: that which is typically placed under the sign of tradition in opposition to the modern has now become prominent under modernization and in conjunction with global capital.[1] This paradox is the effect of a crude historical ordering (premodern, modern, postmodern or late modern) that collapses in the context of these ritual activities. To understand the co-existence and potential co-operation of ritual and capital in contemporary southeast China, we work through Deleuze's discovery of a microsociology at the heart of Tarde's monad-based sociology. Microsociology calls attention to the effectuation of multiple worlds (monads) in the ritual event.

Theorizing ritual

Several hundred villages in Putian county of Fujian Province lie on an alluvial plain that gathers into an estuary. Over the centuries, irrigation networks have made cooperation and competition between villages possible, as riziculture and other agrarian practices held in common generated a degree of regional coherence, which is doubled by a kind of socio-cultural coherence. As various dynasties of the Middle Kingdom expanded and centralized, ritual hierarchies and other courtly practices were imposed upon localities, with so many layers of mediation that even today, in the context of ritual practices and festivals, it would be impossible to say what is local or regional and what is imperial or national.

In light of the diverse institutional frameworks that organize this region (irrigation networks, political parties and government, temple organizations), ritual practices might appear as a kind of subjective glue

holding things together. This is, in fact, a common approach to ritual – or, more specifically, a common Durkheimian or Cartesian approach – which situates a village festival or ritual event in terms of an overarching or underlying social order. This was also, in effect, the imperial dynastic opinion of ritual: ritual was to mediate and soothe out the tensions between competing practices and institutional registers, while re-hierarchizing them aesthetically. Ritual here, at an extreme, becomes nothing in itself. Instead it is *of* everything else. And in a structuralist framework, it is on the verge of becoming a sort of ubiquitous originary absence.[2]

If we submit on the contrary that ritual *is* something, it is not only because we are struck by the tremendous collective energies unleashed in ritual events. (What is this commitment to spontaneity? Is it merely a valve to let off potentially revolutionary energies?) If we insist that ritual *is* something, it is also because we see the pitfalls of a structuralist approach in which there is an originary indetermination that can only be displaced.

Deleuze's concept of microsociology seems to us particularly promising in the study of ritual activities in southeast China. This is first because those ritual activities have typically been construed in exceedingly Durkheimian terms – as a site of imposition of social facts, of the reproduction of the social, as a site of elimination of difference – from which the articulation of local differences or autonomies always appears tenuous at best. By the very terms of this model, local difference is fated to capitulate to the imperial center, with its quasi-Cartesian Confucian order. In other fields, there exist other accounts of ritual activities that stress the spontaneous emergence of practices as well as a thoroughgoing renegotiation of the social order, but the general sociological bias to the study of Northeast Asia is geared largely to the reinscription of immutable national or proto-national identities. This bias is due to a legacy of modernization theory in the formation of area studies; a legacy which is entrenched and unexamined.

Because microsociology thinks the social from the angle of the event, it foregoes the dubious logic of modernization theory, in which the duality of *individual* and *society* is transposed onto that of *modernity* and *tradition*, and in which the modern individual is understood to struggle against the constraints of traditional society in an attempt to Westernize and modernize (an attempt that is preordained to fail no matter how far modernization advances). While the refusal to question modernization theory appears most virulent in the context of area studies, it is not unusual for philosophers – even those thinkers schooled in the very philosophies of difference that issued a challenge to modernization – to replicate it as soon as they step out of the Western enclave. And so we think it crucial to insist on the ways in which a Deleuzian microsociology parts company with the assumptions of modernization theory. Microsociology also holds out promise because it allows us to think ritual activities in terms of the 'differently different' – or, to reprise Deleuze's citation of Tarde: that difference 'which opposes nothing and which serves no purpose'.[3] Such a non-oppositional and non-utilitarian thinking of difference in ritual activities suggests a general economy based primarily not on modes of production but on expenditure. As such, we encounter basic questions about the relation between festival and capital.[4]

Microsociology

Deleuze's discussion of an historical crisis in psychology – that of overcoming the duality of image and movement – might well be applied to sociology and social theory. Traditionally in psychology, images were placed in consciousness, and movements in space. But how to pass from one order to the other? How, asks Deleuze, 'can movement be prevented from already being at least a virtual image, and the image from already being at least possible movement'?[5] Deleuze writes of two very different authors who strove to overcome the duality of image and movement, each with his war cry: 'all consciousness is consciousness of something (Husserl), or more strongly, all consciousness *is* something (Bergson)'.[6]

An analogous problem cropped up in social theory, that of a duality of regulation and innovation – of fixed positions and transformations, of institutions and creation – which has also been described in terms of a general tension or debate between Cartesianism and 'spontaneity'.[7] How to explain the fact that regulations and social institutions can produce innovations, or that innovation and creation can generate fixed positions? The dilemma rested on the status of the human individual in relation to society. Two thinkers appeared with radically different ideas about the relation between the individual and society: Durkheim and Tarde. Durkheim posited social facts as exterior to the individual – imposed on the individual through a sort of constraint – and, as a result, excluded psychology from sociology. Thus for Durkheim, the individual psyche is *nothing*, or, more specifically, the mind is always *of* a social action, to wit, of a Cartesian striving for social order. In contrast, for Tarde, 'every thing is a society, every phenomenon is a social fact',[8] even the mind. Psychology thus is central to sociology, and social action

emerges from the spontaneous imitation of beliefs and desires. The mind *is* a social action.

This is surely one point of departure for thinking a Deleuzian social theory: varieties of an 'action-mind' analogous to the concept of the movement-image which he develops in *Cinema 1*.[9] But one would have to take care to distinguish a socio-philosophy of the action-mind from a psychological study of the 'intermental' aspects of the individual, that is, the individual insofar as other individuals influence it. This is a common take on Tarde. Yet, as Deleuze remarks in an extended footnote, 'it is completely wrong to reduce Tarde's sociology to a psychologism or even an interpsychology ... [w]hat Tarde inaugurates is a microsociology, which is not necessarily concerned with what happens between individuals but with what happens within a single individual'.[10] Crucial to a microsociology that would avoid psychologism is an understanding of the individual as a monad, much as announced in Tarde's *Monadologie et Sociologie*.[11]

Tarde draws his inspiration for the monad from Leibniz who invented it in response to an untenable duality in Descartes' physics: a resolute division of matter and soul, or objects and subjects. Descartes argued that the essence of matter is spatial extension, and that all of a body's properties are modes of spatial extension. Or, as William James puts it: 'Descartes for the first time defined thought as the absolutely unextended, and later philosophers have accepted the description as correct'.[12] Leibniz argued that matter must have some non-geometrical properties. It cannot consist of merely being extended, because there must be something to be extended or simultaneously and continuously repeated. Leibniz worked against the dualisms generated in the physical sciences. He could not accept analyses that divide reality in two different kinds of entities – matter and spirit/mind/soul, or matter and energy/force. The monad is his solution, for the monad (unlike the atom of classical physics) is not indivisible, nor does it introduce a division between matter and mind.

It remained to Tarde to take the monad into the emerging science of sociology as a way to move past its dead-end dualisms. To address sociological problems, Tarde significantly altered Leibniz's monads, arriving at a conceptualization of monads as intensive (non-physical, that is, mental), self-differentiating, open-ended unities. For Tarde, monads are involved in *coordinating* that which he understood as 'societies' or 'assemblages' – including those operating at all levels from the subatomic through the biological to larger social groups such as armies and monasteries. He attributed to monads activity, appetite, and desire, as

well as a sense of self-consistency (belief) and a particular perspective (point of view, perception). While some monads coordinate or even dominate other monads, Tarde sustained Leibniz's commitment to think the infinitesimal and thus avoided recourse to a duality of external social facts and internal psychological states.[13]

While Deleuze does not evoke the monad as such in his brief account of Tarde, he situates him in the tradition of Leibniz and speaks of infinitesimals. For Deleuze, there is no opposition between an individual human monad and a society or collective. Rather, an individual and society emerge together, and what looks like the psychic state of an individual turns out to be an integration/differentiation of small social variations. Deleuze provides a gloss on two examples from Tarde: 'hesitation understood as "infinitesimal social opposition", or invention as "infinitesimal social adaptation".'[14] Deleuze reprises Tarde's criticism of Durkheim, noting that Durkheim assumes what must be explained, namely, 'the similarity of thousands of men'.[15] Whence their similarity? Tarde finds laws of imitation, invention, and opposition that are ontologically prior to social hierarchies and imposition of social facts. Deleuze stresses this ontological priority by insisting on a *micro-sociology*: if one reads the laws of imitation sociologically, at the same level as institutions, one completely misses out on molecular movement.[16] This is what it means to look at ritual practices *micro-sociologically*: one attends to the microsociological categories of imitation, adaptation, and opposition.

In sum, Deleuze's comments on Tarde, in conjunction with his work on Leibniz and the movement-image, suggest to us a microsociology that deals with the individual as a monad, looking at it in terms of infinitesimal social variation. Because the monad effectively goes beyond a duality of individual psyche and social action, we have suggested the term 'action-mind' for this microsociological player. As awkward as the term action-mind may be, it seems to us important to retain some sense of the psyche or mind, even in the most generalized sense (all social facts, all things, are potentially minds), not in order to sustain psychology or to centre philosophy on the subject, but in order to allow room for some account of the historical emergence of subjects and thus of power formations.[17] In the present theoretical sketch of the ritual event, we hope to make clear that the action-minds brought into play in ritual events in south-east China might tactically accrue subjective technologies.

Varieties of action-mind

What does it mean to see the ritual event in terms of performative monads, rather than in terms of the mediation of institutions? If we

consider what is deemed the crucial and central action of ritual activities and festivities in villages in southeast China – the summoning of the deity from the temple, usually to partake of the feast and thus to confirm the villages' productivity – we now have eyes and ears for the micromonad or action-mind. We thus note first that the deity has a double or multiple personality. Deities often harbor contradictory personality traits, which allows them to share a trait or two with duplicitous deities in neighboring villages. The deity's mind thus acts in more than one place at the same time. What is more, deities are poised between earth and some other celestial realm. And the hesitation of the deity to come forth from the temple, all the efforts to cajole and usher it out, can be understood in terms of infinitesimal social opposition. The deity, its action-mind, integrates the small variations of opposition in the social order – across villages, within a village, between village and cosmos. At this first level of Tarde's philosophy, Deleuze notes 'three fundamental categories which govern all phenomena: repetition, opposition, adaptation'.[18] It is worth citing Deleuze's account of it in full:

Opposition…is only the figure by means of which a difference is distributed throughout repetition in order to limit it and to open up a new order or a new infinity: for example, when the parts of life are opposed in pairs, it renounces any indefinite growth or multiplication in order to form limited wholes. Nevertheless, life thereby attains an infinity of another kind, a different sort of repetition: that of generation.[19]

In other words, at this level, difference serves repetition, and the result is the limitation of the whole that diminishes multiplication and puts it in the service of generation: a limited kind of multiplication. This is, in effect, what the deity does. Despite the potential in its multiple personality for infinite connections within and among villages, the deity tends to settle into opposed pairs of traits (in the almost archetypal fashion beloved of Jung[20] – small yet big, earthly yet divine, benevolent yet malign). Thus it forms a limited whole that is almost, but not exactly, synonymous with its village. Its force of cosmological multiplication (a deity that potentially harbors all deities within it) turns into a force of generation for the village. This is a largely agrarian sense of generation or of 'semination' – the prolixity of grains, domestic beasts and male offspring. So it is that the limitation of multiplication to genera-tion/semination confirms the deity's role in bestowing its blessing on the village's productivity. Of course, the deity must hesitate, if it is to

integrate social opposition into the collective of the ritual event, infinitesimally.

Deleuze is well aware that there is something conservative at this level of Tarde's philosophy, for it is that at which Tarde sees 'imitation as the repetition of an innovation'.[21] In the context of ritual, this means that the mass of participants are seen simply to imitate the innovations of some great innovator. Consequently, Deleuze calls attention to 'a deeper level' of Tarde's philosophy, at which 'it is repetition which serves difference'.[22] This is also the level at which Tarde turns away from 'impersonal givens or the Ideas of great men' in favor of 'the little ideas of little men'.[23] For Deleuze, this becomes a matter of 'little inventions and interferences between imitative currents'.[24]

This encourages us to turn from the deity to the experience of the ritual event. In a prototypical ritual event in a Putian village, as a prelude to summoning forth the deity in the temple, Taoist and Three-in-One ritual specialists form two groups in the courtyard before the temple. They set up portable altars in accordance with ritual prescriptions and begin to dance and gallop between and around the altars in cosmological configurations. The carefully prepared and overcoded space is designed to prevent a chaotic, undirected release of the force of the deity as it tentatively and hesitantly leaves its perch in the temple. The idea is to harness and guide that cosmological force.

Such a controlled relation to cosmological forces we will refer to as *sheng*,[25] for it evokes self-cultivation, sageliness, and hierarchical codes. In terms of the practices of ritual masters and specialists, *sheng* implies controlled processes of self-transformation – techniques of visualization, the recitation of 'secret' mantra, performance of mudras (hand gestures enacted so fluidly and rapidly as to blur distinctions between signs), and choreography – all of which lead to identification with a divinity in a stepwise, encoded fashion. At the same time, *sheng* works within hierarchical overcoding and carefully decodes signs in order to move upward in the hierarchical ladder. The creation of zones of indistinction allows the movement to attain a higher level of coding – until the point that one reaches the divinity itself. *Sheng* thus entails a process of sensory-motor experimentation not unlike what Tarde thinks of as invention, or what Deleuze refers to as: 'infinitesimal social adaptation'.[26]

The question of *sheng* is whether it attains the depth for which it aims. Like adaptation, *sheng* can be understood as 'the figure by means of which the repetitive currents meet and become integrated into superior repetitions'.[27] For *sheng* elaborately arranges out insides and outsides – hierarchical concentric circles – with the deity or deities at the pinnacle.

The image is one of infinite ascent, a mountain whose peak vanishes into the sky, like that of deities within the temple. The devices of *sheng* suggest an esoteric approach to religious experience insofar as they imply that: while in theory, anyone can undertake the intensive training needed to attain identification with the deity, in practice, few are capable of such austerities, and very few reach the highest point, the summit, or deity. At this level, *sheng* might appear to occlude a deeper experience of difference, precisely because, as the figure of adaptation, 'difference appears between two kinds of repetition, and each repetition presupposes a difference of the same degree as itself.'[28]

At the same time, insofar as *sheng* is a figure of sensory-motor experimentation that *integrates* the bodily adaptations of the practitioner, *sheng* implies not only adaptation but also invention, and invention is, in turn, *infinitesimal* social adaptation. Simply put, there is an effect of mise-en-abyme with *sheng* (an infinite sequence of repetitions of the image within the image): because the deity at the pinnacle is ultimately multiple, the practitioner cannot simply ascend to the peak; the adept must simultaneously move sideways, eccentrically, toward potentially infinite centers. *Sheng* thus generates a finite area with infinite surface; a cosmological fractal.[29] Nonetheless, because *sheng* makes the relation between finite and infinite appear manageable and controllable, it easily betrays its 'depth' (infinitesimal adaptation) in favor of a simple adaptive process. Surely this is why esoteric approaches often have such an easy relation with the powers at hand, and with state formations.

At the other extreme is what we call *ling*,[30] best exemplified in spirit possession, that is, possession by a deity or demon, which involves trance, loss of self, spontaneous and uncontrolled bodily movements, and speaking in the voices of gods. *Ling* appears to be all depth. Yet its depth comes not from a simple outside, nor is it an inner depth (interiority) in relation to *sheng*. Rather, it recalls the 'inside of the outside' evoked in Deleuze's discussion of Foucault.[31] The loss of self in trance, for instance, implicates an inside deeper than interiority; one that is also ecstatic (opening to outside), with limbs twitching and tongues speaking in response to the deities' passage. *Ling* might be thought of as a radical scrambling of all the material and sensory paraphernalia of esoteric practices. It is reminiscent of exoteric approaches to religious experience, in which: no particular training is needed since the deity already resides within you, but, as a consequence, there is no guarantee where or when (or even if) the deity will happen to you. Basically, *ling* says: 'Every step up the mountain looks the same, so how do you know what step you are at? Any step might be *the* step.' And indeed the trances of *ling* make the

first step and the pinnacle indistinguishable. Trances impart automatic identification with the gods, which arrives as automatism, as tics and twitches and babble.

The apparently automatic diffusion of states of ecstatic trance throughout a crowd at ritual events suggests that, in terms of social variation, *ling* is a matter of diffusion. Deleuze refers to 'diffusion as repetition of perturbation', which sits well with *ling*. At one level, *ling* can presuppose a repetition of a difference (a perturbation that arrives as twitch and babble) of the same degree, resulting in an apparently preordained diffusion of the faith from person to person. At another level, *ling* is sensory-motor perturbation as infinitesimal social diffusion: radically non-hierarchized integration; a decidedly utopian and anarchic action-mind. While *ling* may appear closer to what Deleuze calls 'the deeper level' at which 'repetition serves difference', we should note, in our micro-monadological way, that *ling* could also be understood as a 'shallower' process of diffusion. At an extreme, *ling* could border on proselytism (something endemic to exoteric sects, it would seem). Generally, popular ritual activity in rural China does not concern itself with the transmission of articles of faith, but with kinds of ritual action as addressed to multifarious groupings of local deities, and so proselytism per se is not an issue. Nonetheless implicit in *ling* is a making-similar that may not confine itself to automatism.

In sum, if we adopt Deleuze's suggestions for the transformation of Tarde's monadology into a microsociology (rather than sociology), we are invited to think the ritual event in terms of monadic action-minds. Above, we sketched three varieties of action-mind: (1) hesitation and duplicity of the deity as infinitesimal social opposition; (2) sensory-motor experimentation as infinitesimal social adaptation, or *sheng*; and (3) perturbation in trance-like experiences as infinitesimal social diffusion, or *ling*. Surely there are many others.

What interests us about the ritual event is its evocation of many action-minds at once. Not only do the ritual specialists and spirit mediums in the course of the many days of a ritual event move between *sheng* and *ling* action-minds, but also, as the deity emerges from the temple and circulates through the village, different performative monads appear at different locations and at differing speeds. In addition to *sheng* and *ling*, a variety of performative nodes spring up around ritual objects, such as the incense burner or the palanquin, or even around the operas and puppet dramas that occur in conjunction with the ritual event. It is possible to perceive and experience the entire ritual event from one of these nodes. Some villagers are there for the opera, others

to ogle the crowd or to eat, while others arrive to entreat the deities. In other words, the ritual event comprises a variety of different monadic viewing positions (simultaneous but non-synchronous). Simply put, action-minds, as monads, are 'possible worlds', and the ritual event generates multiple possible worlds.

Here we confront the most perplexing and important question of the ritual event, which follows directly from Deleuze's encounter with Leibniz. Are these compossible or incompossible worlds? What is the relation between monadic worlds? Does the ritual event conjure up a transcendent or metaphysical point of view that guarantees the truth of all these possible worlds and their interrelations?

Incompossible worlds

Because different action-minds and performative nodes of the ritual event perceive some parts of the event more distinctly and other parts more obscurely, they resonate with Leibniz's monadic worlds: each has its truth, and as such, one faces the problem of the relation between different truths. As Lazzarato notes, Tarde complicates this problem considerably, for Tarde sees monads as open. Lazzarato writes: 'monads interpenetrate each other reciprocally in place of being exterior to one another'.[32] With respect to perception, we again see the action-mind as infinitesimal variation, as a differential relation between various layers of thought (not only the conscious and the unconscious). This opens thought to what might be called a transcendental field of pre-individual singularities.[33] This is certainly true of the monadic action-minds of the Putian ritual: *sheng* and *ling* interpenetrate each other reciprocally, resulting in other differential relations. Nonetheless, as Deleuze remarks, the concept of temporality implied by multiple worlds (even if co-penetrating as in Tarde's model) presents a problem for the notion of truth, because, at every event, time bifurcates into different temporalities with incompossible truths.[34]

Confronted with this problem, Leibniz resorted to an overall view – that of God – which lets you know whether you are in one world or another. Similarly, in the ritual event, one might refer to the deities in order to say, 'I didn't see the ritual masters summon the deities, but I know this took place, and so my experience is relative to that overall truth.' So long as the deities provide some kind of overall view, the ritual event can imply a supreme or all-gathering witness or celestial realm. Such a view of the ritual event, however, repeats the aristocratic stance that so often mars Tarde's sociology: everything moves from the top

down, from the great innovator to the masses, from a god-like creator to the worlds. It also places difference at the service of repetition: the difference between action-minds becomes homogeneous, implying pre-established harmony among them. Deleuze's extrication of a microsociology at the heart of Tarde's sociology bids us to turn to a deeper level at which repetition: 'is what enables us to pass from one order of difference to another ... [r]epetition, therefore, is not the process by which difference is augmented and diminished, but the process by which it "goes on differing" and "takes itself as its end".[35] It is a 'difference "which opposes nothing and which serves no purpose", which is "the final end of all things".[36] Or, in the relation to the ritual event: 'This is the apparent paradox of festivals: they repeat the unrepeatable'.[37]

The ritual event is always a matter of the 'differently different'.[38] At one level – as a whole or an *all* – the ritual event effectuates worlds. The ritual event is the repetition of a differential (polyphony), which lends itself to social reproduction when polyphony (its anarchy) appears in the guise of social variation. At a deeper level, however – as a differential, as polyphony – the ritual event is infinitesimal world effectuation.[39] As such, the ritual event offers a way to rethink its own importance in contemporary China. For in the ritual event we perceive the potential autonomy of the multiple worlds at once integrated and differentiated. These multiple worlds are not relative truths of an overarching Truth (God). They are instead like the parallel universes of science fiction. One might, for instance, conjure up a parallel universe in which the Cultural Revolution did not take place. This idea of parallel universes, however, sustains a notion of Truth (despite its temporal diversity) if it boils down to a matter of knowing which universe you are in: the one with the Cultural Revolution or the one without it. Ritual activities in southeast China occur in the universe in which the Cultural Revolution both happened and did not happen. Their revival in conjunction with globalization is only a paradox in appearance, in accordance with an ideology, a Truth, of socio-economic development that can no longer be sustained. Ritual activities ask us to rethink the temporality of capital.

The microsociological perspective sketched out here provides a good point of departure for rethinking the problem of ritual and capital, for it leads us to an understanding of the ritual event as an effectuation of worlds. It is at the effectuation of worlds that the problem of ritual intersects that of capital. Working with Tarde's sociology, Deleuze's philosophy and Negri's analysis of capital, Lazzarato calls attention to an effectuation of worlds at the heart of capitalism that is

ontologically prior to modes of production. He sees capitalism in this way precisely because he adopts a sort of micro-economic perspective: he addresses transformations in capital in certain sectors, inverted the priority of macroeconomics and microeconomics. In addition, he thinks through Negri's theorization of labor power as a constituent force (an ontologically prior creativity) in contrast to labor. The result is a non-utilitarian theory of an effectuation of worlds (labor power) ontologically prior to modes of production (labor), which meshes nicely with a non-utilitarian philosophy of monads (world effectuation) ontologically prior to the subject.

It is here that we see the possibility in Deleuze of a social theory of capital unlike the one laid out in *A Thousand Plateaus*. This socio-political theory of capital would begin with a microsociology derived from monadology. And the ritual event would become *the* crucial event for such a theory, precisely because the infinitesimal world effectuation of the ritual event asks us to think differently from capital but not oppositionally. It bids us to consider the differently different between capital and ritual. For the ritual event is not simply an obstacle to the movement of capital, nor a contradiction within it. As Lazzarato puts it: 'How to understand concepts of labor, production, cooperation and communication when capitalism is not only a mode of production but *a production of worlds?*'[40] The promise of a microsociology of contemporary ritual activities in southeast China lies in the attention it calls to an infinitesimal world effectuation. This in turn opens not only into questions about technologies of the subject, but also to an articulation of microeconomic exchanges that are, by virtue of being ontologically prior to modes of production, open to socio-historical transformations other than via capital.

Notes

1. See Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', in Lamarre, T. & Nae-hui, K. (Eds) *Traces 3: Impacts of Modernities* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2003), pp. 257–294. See also: Dean, K. *Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Dean, K. *Lord of the Three in One: The Spread of a Cult in Southeast China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

2. This might lead to an incorrect way of thinking the virtual in Deleuze. In *The Site of the Social*, for instance, Theodore Schatzki construes Deleuze and Guattari's account of social assemblages and the problem of the virtual entirely in structuralist terms, positing the virtual as a pre-existent (yet unfortunately in his opinion not causal) structuration that is unfolded in actualization or substantialization. But, much in the way that Bakhtin argues that there are

no pre-existent linguistic structures, Deleuze makes clear that the virtual is not a pre-existent structure in seed form. Actualization of the virtual is akin to a performative utterance that makes and unmakes its rules and structures. Surely this is also why Deleuze wishes to align the monad with the nomad: let there be no mistaking the monad for an originary indetermination in the structuralist sense.

3. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition* (French: 1968) Trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), pp. 312–313, n. 3.

4. Here we not only sense a possible affinity between Bataille and Deleuze-Tarde but also a dialogue with such thinkers as Lefebvre and Bakhtin. While we will not have the opportunity in this chapter to explore these thinkers or their take on festival and capital in detail, we wish nonetheless to indicate some of the other possible inflections of microsociology.

5. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit.

6. Deleuze, G. *Cinema 1: The Movement Image* (French: 1983) Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 56.

7. Clark, T. 'Introduction', in Clark, T. (Ed.) *Gabriel Tarde on Communication and Social Influence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 8.

8. Tarde, G. *Monadologie et Sociologie*, Oeuvres de Gabriel Tarde, vol. 1 (Paris: Institut Synthélabo, 1999), p. 58.

9. Deleuze, G. *Cinema 1*, op. cit.

10. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.

11. Tarde, G. *Monadologie et Sociologie*, op. cit.

12. James, W. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003), p. 16.

13. For an account of the infinitesimal, see Smith, D. 'Deleuze on Leibniz: Difference, Continuity, and the Calculus', in Smith, D. (Ed.) *Current Continental Theory and Modern Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006), pp. 127–147.

14. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.

15. Ibid.

16. Microsociology also resonates with the Foucault whose microhistories situated subjective technologies and bodies as ontologically prior to modes of production in order to remap modernity.

17. Although we place greater emphasis on questions of subjectivity, we would not want to foreclose some affinities with Latour's 'actor network theory'. See Latour, B. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

18. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.

19. Foucault, M. 'The Subject and Power', Afterword in Dreyfus, H. & Rabinow, P. (Eds) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

20. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.

21. Ibid.

22. Jung, C. 'The Psychology of the Child Archetype', in Jung, K. *Essays on a Science of Mythology* (New York: Pantheon, 1949), pp. 70–100.

23. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit., pp. 312–313, n. 3.

24. Ibid.

25. Sheng, sometimes translated as sacred, holy, saint, or sage, is a term drawn from Chinese religious and philosophic discourses. The term often appears in the titles of gods worshipped in Putian temples. For further discussion of this concept, see Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', op. cit.

26. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit, pp. 312-313, n. 3.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. As in multiple deities of mandala: although hierarchized, they communicate eccentrically via color and tone.

30. Ling, sometimes translated as numinous, efficacious, spirit or sprite, is a term drawn from Chinese religious and philosophic discourses. The term often appears in the titles of gods worshipped in Putian temples. For further discussion of this concept, see Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', op. cit.

31. Deleuze, G. *Foucault* (French: 1986) Trans. S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), P. 120.

32. Lazzarato, M. *Les revolutions du capitalisme* (Paris: Éditions les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2004), p. 34.

33. See again: Smith, D. 'Deleuze on Leibniz', op. cit, pp. 127-147.

34. Deleuze, G. *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (French: 1988) Trans. T. Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), P. 62.

35. Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit, pp. 312-313, n. 3.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid, P. 1.

38. In the light of microsociology, the deity is what Deleuze calls 'crowned anarchy' (Deleuze, G. *Difference and Repetition*, op. cit, pp. 41 and 224), or elsewhere, 'sociability whose transcendental object would be anarchy' (p. 167).

39. Space does not permit us in this context to discuss in full why we think it better to discuss this combination of crowned anarchy and polyphony in terms of metastable states. For a fuller account, see Dean, K. & Lamarre, T. 'Ritual Matters', op. cit.

40. Lazzarato, M. 'From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life', in *Ephemera*, 4(3)(2004), p. 187.